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abstract
With some common-property natural resources, cooperative behavior by resource users persists over multiple
generations. This paper presents a noncooperative dynamic game with overlapping generations of players
using a common-property resource. The evolution of the resource stock depends on how much is harvested
by the agents in each generation. This study identiﬁes conditions under which a subgame perfect equilibrium
supports an eﬃcient, cooperative resource use. It explores how heterogeneity among the agents and changes
in outside economic opportunities aﬀect cooperation in the commons. The study ﬁnds that, depending on
the agents’ harvest sharing rule, the condition under which homogeneous agents can cooperate in equilib-
rium may not be suﬃcient for cooperation when agents diﬀer in harvesting productivity. It also suggests
that integration of local commons to the outside market economy may have a negative eﬀect on eﬃcient
local resource management. The paper concludes with an explanation of stylized facts about long-enduring
self-governed commons, and policy implications regarding local resource management and rural ﬁnance when
the commons face changes in the outside economic environment.1 Introduction
Individuals often lack private property rights to resources such as ﬁsheries, grazing lands and
forests but share them in common with a group of people. Lacking sole ownership, each user
has a temptation to deviate from what is optimal for the group and may overuse the resource.
As implied by the words “tragedy of the commons,” many communities with common-property
resources (CPRs) face the problem of resource degradation.1 However, some CPRs are collectively
yet successfully managed by a large number of users without overuse.2 With these CPRs, resource
users set their own rules of resource use with reward for cooperation and punishment for non-
cooperation. The resource users do not necessarily count on a legal system for solving disputes, or
taxes or regulations set by an outside authority.3 In addition, with most resources that have been
successfully self-governed by the users, cooperation persisted over many generations of resource
users. Cooperative rural land use in Switzerland and Japan was sustained for several hundred
years until the twentieth century (Ostrom 1990, McKean 1986). Resource users with diﬀerent life
spans, possibly facing diﬀerent economic conditions in diﬀerent periods, have managed to cooperate
across generations in these cases.
Why do we observe cooperation across generations of resource users in some cases and not
in others? To answer this question, this paper uses a non-cooperative dynamic game of CPR
use by overlapping generations of players and ﬁnds conditions under which generations of players
cooperate to achieve eﬃcient resource use as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.
Such conditions characterize the relationship between ﬁrst-best sustainability and parameters that
are considered to be relevant in the stylized facts about cooperation in the commons—carrying
capacity of the resource, the number of resource users in each generation, their discount rate and
1For example, Turkish inshore ﬁsheries and groundwater in California to name a few (Ostrom 1990).
2Examples include mountain meadows in rural villages in Switzerland and Japan, irrigation in coastal Spain and
the lobster ﬁshery in Maine (Ostrom 1990, McKean 1986, Acheson 1988). Extensive collections of case studies on
CPRs include National Research Council (1986), Wade (1988), Tang (1992), Baland and Platteau (1996) and Agrawal
(2002).
3The Maine lobster ﬁshery is an example where both self-governance by ﬁshermen and governmental restrictions
on the ﬁshery have worked to avoid resource degradation (Acheson 1988, Acheson and Brewer 2003).
1harvesting technology.
This study addresses two additional issues of common-property resource use: the eﬀects
of heterogeneity among resource users and outside economic opportunities on cooperation in the
commons. Empirical studies show that heterogeneity among resource users discourages eﬃcient
CPR management (Bardhan 1995). One type of heterogeneity among agents is their life span:
agents of diﬀerent generations may have diﬀerent interests in resource conservation. In addition,
many CPRs are used by people who diﬀer in harvesting productivity, income or wealth levels. In
CPR use such as irrigation, rural villages have a variety of resource output-sharing rules ranging
from equal sharing to a sharing scheme where farmers with larger wealth or land receive a greater
amount of outputs from commons (Bardhan 2000, Dayton-Johnson 2000). This study examines
ﬁrst-best sustainability in a dynamic context where agents from diﬀerent generations with diﬀerent
productivity use a commons, and describes how heterogeneity aﬀects cooperation under alternative
harvest-sharing rules and diﬀerent outside options.
In many countries, the functions of local non-market organizations, including those for CPR
use, have changed as local communities gained access to outside markets for labor supply, exchange
of harvests for other commodities, and inputs for harvesting and production of other goods. Some
authors argue that improved accessibility and market integration of isolated, fragile areas into
the mainstream economy have led to over-exploitation of CPRs (for example, Jodha 1992 cited
in Baland and Platteau 1996, p.271). Baland and Platteau (1996) also report case studies where
“younger generations tend to be less and less interested in village aﬀairs in general, and in the
regulation of local CPRs in particular, when they have alternative income sources in the village
(e.g., by growing cash crops in individual ﬁelds) or, above all, when they have got an employment
in a distant place” (p.276). Income changes of rural people in developing countries have ambiguous
eﬀects on the intensity of environmental resources use (Dasgupta and M¨ aler 1994). Changes in the
market environment for local communities are sometimes delivered intentionally by outside agencies
as a policy against rural poverty. An example is ‘microﬁnance’ or ‘microcredit,’ small loans by
2commercial banks or non-governmental organizations (e.g. the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) to
poor farmers in rural communities for income-generating activities (Anderson et al. 2003, p.265).
In some cases, microﬁnance resulted in further resource degradation.4 This study analyzes a version
of the model where resource users in each period have an option to participate in outside markets
or to receive microcredit, and examines formally whether improved access to each type of outside
markets conﬂicts with eﬃcient resource use.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are summarized as follows. The results of the model explain
stylized facts about successful commons (proposition 1): a ﬁrst-best, cooperative resource use is
supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when the resource users’ discount rate is low,
the number of resource users is small, and the resource capacity is large (i.e. large carrying capacity
and high intrinsic growth rate of the resource) relative to the resource users’ harvesting capacity.
Whether heterogeneity of resource users aﬀects ﬁrst-best sustainability depends on the way resource
users share their harvest. Heterogeneity among resource users in harvesting productivity does not
inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability when a resource user’s harvest share is proportional to the user’s
eﬀort exerted for harvesting (corollary 1). If the resource users’ harvest shares are equal regardless of
each one’s eﬀort exerted, then the ﬁrst best becomes unsupportable in equilibrium when inequality
in productivity of resource users increases (corollary 2). Access to an outside labor market does
not inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability and may increase the resource users’ maximum equilibrium
welfare (proposition 3). However, cooperation may become unsupportable when agents have access
to product markets and such access may be welfare-decreasing for the resource users (corollary
3). Microcredit, which allows agents to increase harvest productivity and production of other
goods, can also discourage agents to cooperate in resource use when they could sustain cooperation
without such credit (proposition 5). These results explain how local non-market institutions may
deteriorate as resource users in local commons gain access to external markets or microcredit.
4Anderson et al. (2002) reports that “In Madagascar, access to member-based ﬁnancial institutions encouraged
agricultural intensiﬁcation ...[which,] while reducing pressure on forests and grasslands, ...increased demands on
irrigation and other water systems” (p.97). According to their survey on 147 microcredit organizations, 12% (42%)
of the respondents answered that the rate of deforestation (water use) increased in villages where microcredit was
introduced.
3Some existing studies have analyzed the eﬀects of heterogeneity on eﬃcient use of commons
using static games or ﬁnite-horizon games (Sandler 1992, Baland and Platteau 1997, 1999 and
Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 2002).5 Unlike ﬁnite-horizon games, the inﬁnite-horizon game in
this paper characterizes cooperative resource use with a threat of future punishment on tempo-
rary defectors—a mechanism often observed in successfully self-governed CPRs (Ostrom 1990).6
Theoretical studies ﬁnd ambiguity regarding the eﬀects of outside options on cooperative use of
commons (Baland and Platteau 1997, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 2002). By examining diﬀer-
ent eﬀects of diﬀerent outside options—access to labor markets, product markets and credit, this
paper delineates how ﬁrst-best sustainability changes when agents have access to diﬀerent types of
markets.
In what follows, section 2 introduces a dynamic game of CPR use by overlapping generations
of players. Section 3 identiﬁes conditions under which a Pareto optimal allocation is supported
as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when agents have no outside options, and examines
the eﬀects of heterogeneity among agents on ﬁrst-best sustainability. Section 4 discusses how a
change in diﬀerent types of outside economic opportunities (access to labor or product markets
and microcredit) aﬀect cooperation in the commons. Section 5 concludes the paper with policy
implications regarding local resource management.
2 The Model
2.1 Game environment
This section deﬁnes a game of CPR use by overlapping generations of players.
Players
In each period starting from period 0, N agents are born and live for 2 periods. In period 0 there
5Wiggins and Libecap (1987) argued that ﬁrms with smaller reserves or output shares have stronger incentive to
deviate from quota limits imposed by an oil-production cartel. Mason and Polasky (2002) argue that countries with
larger oil reserves tend to have a stronger incentive to join the OPEC and demonstrated that their prediction ﬁts
well with the actual membership of most oil-producing countries.
6Runge (1981) argued that, using a static-game framework, CPR use should be modelled as an ’assurance problem,’
a game with multiple equilibria where a cooperative equilibrium is supported under some conditions on each agent’s
belief on other agents’ actions.
4exist agents born in period −1. Let (t,i) be the ith agent born in period t.
Assumption 1 Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of labor when young and zero units of labor
when old.
This is a key assumption in the model that implies the dependence of old members on young
members, which is observed in many isolated rural communities with CPRs.
State transition
The agents jointly use a renewable natural resource. The resource stock in period t+1 depends on
the stock size and the amount of harvest in period t:
Assumption 2 The resource transition function g is given by a logistic growth function: with stock
st and total harvest ht in period t, the stock in period t +1is given by
st+1 ≡ st − ht + g(st) where g(st)=rst(1 −
st
K
),r ∈ (0,1] and K>0. (1)
Parameters r and K are the intrinsic growth rate and the carrying capacity of the resource. The
total harvest in period t is determined by the stock available in period t and the actions by the
young agents in period t, as explained below.
Actions and strategies
Labor input l ∈ [0,1] by agent (t,i) yields an eﬀort level e = ail where ai > 0 is the productivity
coeﬃcient that determines the eﬀort level per unit of labor. Assume that the distribution of
productivity ¯ a = {a1,a 2,...,a N} is the same across generations: agents (t,i) and (t+1,i) have the
same productivity ai for all t =1 ,2,...and all i =1 ,...,N. Agents with productivity ai are called
agents of type i. In what follows, assume that each agent (t,i) chooses the eﬀort level between 0
and ai (instead of choosing labor input). Along with eﬀort, each young agent chooses how much
of harvest to transfer to the old agents in the same period. Let ∆N ≡{ θ ∈ IR N
+|
N
j=1 θj ≤ 1} be
the set of vectors of shares that each agent can choose. Then the action set for each agent when




N ) ∈ Ai.
5Then et,i is the eﬀort level by agent (t,i) and θ
t,i
j × 100% of (t,i)’s harvest is transferred to agent
(t − 1,j). As explained later, the agents’ eﬀort proﬁle and the stock level determine each agent’s
harvest share.
What motivates young agents to transfer consumption goods to the old agents from their
previous generation? In this game, and in any game with overlapping generations of players in
general, choosing positive transfers is a best response to all players if the threat of punishment
upon deviation—the threat to a potential deviator by his descendants to choose zero transfer upon
defection—is credible. In any community with a commons, this is not the only intergenerational
transaction; people interact based on kinship. Parents invest in children’s human capital while
the children support their parents when they become old. Hence, it is more plausible to assume
that agent’s productivity depends on investment by their parents. While acknowledging that these
kinship ties are important in intergenerational cooperation in resource use, this paper abstracts
from them and characterize the conditions for ﬁrst-best sustainability in the absence of kinship.
The relationship between the eﬀort and harvest of each agent is as follows. As in equation
(1), the stock available in period t is the stock at the beginning of period t, st, plus the increment
given by natural growth g(st). Let et =( et,1,e t,2,...,e t,N) be the proﬁle of eﬀorts by the young
agents in period t. If the total eﬀort by N young agents in period t does not exceed the available
stock st +g(st), then the total harvest is equal to the sum of eﬀorts
N
i=1 et,i. Otherwise, the total
harvest equals the available stock st + g(st).
Assume that the sharing rule of total harvest is exogenously given to the agent.7 Consider
two alternative harvest-sharing rules observed in case studies: proportional sharing and equal
sharing. Proportional sharing is a harvest-sharing rule where the harvest share of agent (t,i)i s




j=1 et,j · min
N
j=1et,j,s t + g(st)

.
Equal sharing is a harvest-sharing rule where the total harvest is shared equally by the agents who
7Dayton-Johnson (2000) discusses endogeneity of harvest sharing rules in commons.
6Period t Period t +1
Receive transfers from
young agents
Agents born in period t − 1
Choose eﬀort levels





and transfers to old agents
Agents born in period t




St → St + g(St)
St−1 + g(St−1) − ht−1 = St
Resource stock:
Total harvest: ht+1
St+1 → St+1 + g(St+1)
St + g(St) − ht = St+1
Agents born in period t
Figure 1: Interaction between generations in the game.






j=1et,j,s t + g(st)

.
Depending on the type of the resource, institution, culture and norms, one harvest sharing rule
mimics the actual harvest-sharing rule better than the other.8 The next section examines how
heterogeneity in agents’ productivity inﬂuences ﬁrst-best sustainability under the above harvest-
sharing rules.
Players condition their strategies on the history of actions by the previous generations and
the resource stock transition. In the initial period 0, the set of history is given by H0 ≡{ s0}
8Dayton-Johnson (2000) reports that both types of sharing rules are observed in rural irrigation use in Mexico. As
seen in the next section, the eﬀect of agents’ heterogeneity on ﬁrst-best sustainability is diﬀerent under proportional
sharing and equal sharing.







the set of histories of actions and the resource transition from period 0 up to period t − 1. A
history Ht ∈ Ht is a path of actions and the resource stock from period 0 to period t − 1. (A
capitalized H stands for history, and a lowercase h for harvest.) A strategy of agent (t,i) is given










the consumption by agent (t,i) when young and when old.
Assumption 3 Agents cannot save or store the harvest in one period for consumption in another
period.
Under assumption 3, consumption when young (c
t,i
t ) is given by the harvest minus the amount
of transfers to agents {(t − 1,1),...,(t − 1,N)} (i.e. the old agents in period t). Consumption
when old (c
t,i
t+1) is given by the sum of the transfers θ
t+1,j
i ht+1,j(et+1,s t+1) from agent (t +1 ,j),

























Given a strategy proﬁle φ and the actions and the resource transition induced by φ, the life-time

















where β ∈ (0,1] is a discount factor. The following assumption will be maintained in this study.
Assumption 4 The periodwise utility function u : IR + → I R is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave with limc→0 u (c)=∞.
9In fact, agents do not need to have information as much as H
t. The strategy to support a cooperative outcome
can be deﬁned with weaker information requirement.
8Under this assumption, an agent with consumption path (c,0) (where c>0) is better oﬀ with
consumption path (c − ε,ε) for some ε such that 0 <ε<c . Assumptions 1 and 4 imply that
agents are better oﬀ if a transfer scheme is available where young agents in each period give some
of the consumption to the old agents born one period earlier. In summary, a dynamic game of
CPR use by an overlapping generations of players is characterized by a 6-tuple of parameters
<N ,u ,β ,¯ a,g,s0 >.
Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash and subgame perfect equilibria are deﬁned in a conventional way. For a given initial stock s0,
a strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium if no player proﬁts from unilateral deviation. A subgame
perfect equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle such that after every history, the continuations of the
strategy proﬁle constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Feasible and Pareto optimal allocations
Here I deﬁne feasible and Pareto optimal allocations in the game. In particular, I deﬁne a stationary
Pareto optimal allocation where the agents’ harvest is equal to the maximum sustainable yield
(deﬁned later) in each period. An allocation (C,S) consists of a consumption path for each agent













and a sequence of the resource stock
S = {st}∞
t=0. Allocation (C,S) is resource-feasible given s0 ∈ [0,K] if (i) the consumption paths






t ] ≤ min{
N
i=1 ai,s t +g(st)} for all t =0 ,1,2,..., and (iii) the consumption paths






t ] for all t =0 ,1,2,....
Condition (ii) states that the total consumption by the agents alive in period t cannot exceed the
total harvest in period t, which is bounded by technologically feasible harvest (

i ai) and the
resource stock available at the end of period t (st+g(st)). Allocation (C,S) is Pareto optimal given
the initial stock s0 if (i) it is resource-feasible given s0 and (ii) there is no other resource-feasible
allocation (C ,S ) with s 
0 = s0 such that u(c −1,i
0 ) ≥ u(c
−1,i







t+1) for all i =1 ,2,...,Nand all t =0 ,1,2,...with at least one strict inequality for some agent
(τ,j). Under a Pareto optimal allocation, harvest and the resource stock may not be stationary
over time. With some initial stock levels, we can deﬁne a stationary Pareto optimal allocation
where the agents of the same type have the same consumption path. In an overlapping generations
model without assets other than a renewable resource, the stationary Pareto optimal stock levels
depend on the social discount factor (the discount factor in the social welfare function). When the
social discount factor is 1, the stationary Pareto optimal stock level is the one associated with the
maximum harvest yield. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) h∗ and the associated stock s∗
are given by a solution to
max
h≥0,s≥0
h s.t. s ≥ s + g(s) − h and h ≤
N
i=1ai.
The second constraint in the above maximization problem comes from the assumption that the
technologically feasible harvest in one period is bounded by

i ai. It follows from the deﬁnition of










i=1 ai > rK
4
and the associated stationary stock level s∗ is given by
s∗ =
	
min{s ∈ [0,K]:s = s −
N













i=1 ai > rK
4 .
In words, s∗ is the minimum stock level such that the stock does not fall below s∗ when the total
harvest is h∗ in each period. We call rK
4 the unconstrained maximum sustainable yield; this is the
MSY that is feasible if the productivity constraint (h ≤

i ai) is not binding.
A stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY is a stationary Pareto optimal allocation
where the total harvest in each period is the maximum sustainable yield. Under some conditions
on the initial stock s0 and the distribution of productivity ¯ a, a stationary Pareto optimal allocation
with MSY in each period is well deﬁned. Lemma 1 states such conditions.10
10Proof of the lemmas and the propositions in this paper is available from the author.
10Lemma 1 In game <N , u , β , ¯ a,g,s0 > with the resource transition function g given by (1), a
stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY exists (i) if the initial stock is at the MSY level
(s0 = s∗) and agents’ total productivity is greater than or equal to the MSY (
N
i=1 ai ≥ rK
4 )o r
(ii) if the initial stock is greater than or equal to the MSY level (s0 ≥ s∗) and the agents’ total
productivity is less than or equal to the MSY (
N
i=1 ai ≤ rK
4 ). Furthermore, if the periodwise
utility function is given by u(c)=c1/2, then a stationary Pareto optimal consumption allocation
with MSY for type-i agents, (ci∗
y ,c i∗





































i ai) in case (ii) where λi ≥ 0 is the welfare weight of type-i agents
such that
N
i=1 λi > 0.
Parameter λi measures the weight of the type-i agent in each generation. (It is assumed that the
intra-generational distribution of types is the same across generations). With the above cases (i)
and (ii) in lemma 1, section 3.1 will examine whether there is a strategy proﬁle that supports a
stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. With
diﬀerent initial stock levels, a stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY may not be well
deﬁned. In such cases, we need to ﬁnd a non-stationary allocation as a target allocation to be
supported as an equilibrium outcome.
In what follows, assume that the periodwise return function u is given by
u(c)=c1/2. (2)
This functional form is chosen so that the utility is concave in consumption and u(0) is well
deﬁned.11 For the ease of notation, let G denote the game <N , u , β , ¯ a,g,s0 > with resource
transition g and periodwise utility u given by (1) and (2).
3 Commons without Outside Options
In order to identify the eﬀect of heterogeneity on ﬁrst-best sustainability, this section examines
ﬁrst-best sustainability when agents have no outside options.
11In the punishment phase in the proposed strategies to support cooperation, a retired agent has zero consumption
if some agent has deviated from cooperation in a previous period.
113.1 Supporting a stationary Pareto optimal allocation
Consider the following strategy proﬁle to support a stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY
as an equilibrium outcome.
<Strategy proﬁle φ1∗ >










1+β2 for j = i,
0 for j  = i.




4 and gives transfer of
β2
1+β2¯ e∗i to agent (t−1,i).)
Agents repeat this action proﬁle as long as the action proﬁle in the previous period t−1w a s
{(ei,θi)} such that ei ≤ ¯ e∗i and θi ≥ ¯ θ∗i for all i or if two or more agents deviated. If a single
agent deviated in period τ, then move to phase IIτ.
Phase IIτ All young agents in periods after τ choose eﬀort levels {ai} and zero transfer.
In phase I of strategy proﬁle φ1∗, each agent chooses eﬀort and transfer that induce the stationary
Pareto optimal allocation with MSY. Once someone unilaterally deviates from the action in phase I,
then all agents in the following generations choose the maximum eﬀort levels {ai} and zero transfer
(phase II). The strategy proﬁle in the subgames starting from phase II is a Nash equilibrium
because the action proﬁle in phase II is a Nash equilibrium in a stage game given any stock level.
The following proposition gives conditions under which phase I constitutes a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
φ1∗ is subgame perfect:
Proposition 1 In game G with proportional sharing, strategy proﬁle φ1∗ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium and it supports a stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY as the equilibrium
outcome (a) if s0 ≥ s∗ and the agents’ total harvest cannot exceed the MSY (

i ai ≤ rK
4 ) or if (b)




i ai ≤ (1 + β2)rK
4 .
Proof. Under either condition (a) or (b), a stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY is well
deﬁned by lemma 1. We need to show that no player has an incentive to deviate from cooperation
12in both phase I and phase II given any stock level. As discussed above, continuation starting
from Phase II constitutes a Nash equilibrium. It remains to show that phase I constitutes a
Nash equilibrium. Under condition (a), the total harvest by N young agents does not exceed the
maximum sustainable yield rk
4 in each period. Starting with s0 ≥ s∗, the resource stock does
not fall below the MSY level s∗. Hence, the stock dynamics is irrelevant in characterizing the
conditions for supporting the MSY-path as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The only way
the deviation can be proﬁtable in phase I is by deviating from the speciﬁed amount transfer to
the retired. If agent (τ,i) deviates from the actions in phase I, then the maximum consumption
that the agent can have is ai, by harvesting up to the maximum and making zero transfer to the
retired. Then agent (τ,i) receives zero transfer upon retirement, so the maximum deviation payoﬀ
to agent (τ,i)i sa
1/2
i . In phase I, an agent will consume 1
1+β2ai when young and
β2
1+β2ai when old.











term, we have (1 + β2)ai. Because (1 + β2)ai ≥ ai for all i and β ∈ (0,1], it follows that payoﬀs to
deviation never exceed the payoﬀs to cooperation. Hence, cooperation is supported as a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome if

i ai ≤ rK
4 and the initial stock satisﬁes s0 ≥ s∗.
Under condition (b), the maximum total harvest by N young agents exceed the maximum
sustainable yield rK
4 . The maximum payoﬀ to agent (t,i) upon deviation is bounded by a
1/2
i .I f

























































There are two alternative conditions for ﬁrst-best sustainability, (a) and (b). Under condition
(a), the total maximum eﬀort (

i ai) is less than the unconstrained MSY and the initial stock is
13greater than or equal to the MSY level s∗. Given s0 ≥ s∗, this implies that the game is eﬀectively a
repeated game played by overlapping generations of players. The only eﬃciency concern in this case
is whether agents have an incentive to make a positive transfer to the old agents. Such repeated
games have been analyzed by several studies. In particular, under the conditions in proposition 1,
the game is an N-agent version of the ‘pension game’ by Hammond (1975). On the other hand,
under condition (b), the stock can decline to a level below s∗ if agents apply the maximum eﬀort
level. In this dynamic CPR game, the ﬁrst best is sustainable in such nontrivial cases where the
resource depletion is technologically feasible. Proposition 1 implies that cooperation is sustainable
as long as the initial stock is large enough and

i ai ≤ (1 + β2)rK
4 . This inequality holds if the
resource is relatively abundant (large r,K), if the number of resource users N is small, if the agents
are patient (large β), or if the harvesting technology is not advanced (low ai’s). This inequality
as the condition for sustaining cooperation is consistent with empirical ﬁndings on the traditional
CPR use in rural areas with primitive harvesting technology under low population pressure.
Condition (a) in proposition 1 implies that, in a repeated game by overlapping generations
of players (e.g. Hammond 1975), the ﬁrst best is supportable without any further restriction on
the parameters (other than condition (a) which guarantees that the game is a repeated game).
Condition (b) is stronger than condition (a), implying that stronger conditions are needed for
agents to support cooperation across generations in dynamic games than in repeated games.
The following corollary states that inequality does not aﬀect ﬁrst-best sustainability under
proportional sharing.12
Corollary 1 Suppose harvest is shared according to proportional sharing. Consider two games G
and G  that are identical except for the distribution of productivity ¯ a and ¯ a  where ¯ a  is a mean-
preserving spread of ¯ a.I f(1 + β2)rK
4 ≥

i ai and s0 ≥ s∗, then the following strategy proﬁle φ1∗
is a subgame perfect equilibrium and supports the same stationary Pareto-optimal allocation with
MSY in both G and G .
12This invariance result is robust against the choice of the functional form of the utility function.
14Under proportional sharing, the continuation payoﬀ to defection is proportional to the agent’s
productivity. With transfers proportional to the agents’ productivity, the continuation payoﬀ to
cooperation is also proportional to the agent’s productivity. This is why redistribution of produc-
tivity among agents does not inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability. In previous studies such as Baland
and Platteau (1997), inequality does aﬀect the eﬃciency of the resource use (even though the eﬀect
is ambiguous). The above neutrality result on inequality is due to the nature of the model in this
study.13
The following proposition characterizes ﬁrst-best sustainability under equal sharing.
Proposition 2 In game G with equal sharing, a stationary Pareto-optimal allocation with MSY is
supportable as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if maxi ai ≤ (1 + β2)rK
4N.
Under equal sharing, the continuation payoﬀ to cooperation is under-proportional to the agent’s
productivity whereas the continuation payoﬀ to defection is proportional to the agent’s productivity.
Cooperation must be preferred to defection by all agents; hence, ﬁrst-best sustainability depends
on the productivity of the most productive agent. In other words, the agent with the highest
productivity is the ‘weakest link’ in sustaining cooperation.
Comparing a distribution and its mean-preserving spread, the maximum among the agents’
productivity may be larger with the former or the latter. Hence, under equal sharing, the eﬀect of
increasing inequality on ﬁrst-best sustainability is ambiguous: inequality may or may not enhance
ﬁrst-best sustainability. However, an increase in inequality among homogeneous agents may make
the ﬁrst best unsupportable (e.g., if a =( 1+β2)rK
4N prior to the increase in inequality).
Corollary 2 Consider game G with equal sharing. Suppose ¯ a = {ai}N
i=1 where ai = a for all i.
For any ¯ a such that a ≤ (1 + β2)rK
4N, there exists a mean-preserving spread of ¯ a (call it ¯ a ) such
that the ﬁrst-best outcome is not supportable under a game with ¯ a .
13In Dayton-Johnson (2000), heterogeneity does not inﬂuence the equilibrium under both of the above two harvest-
sharing rules. In his model, the post-deviation payoﬀ is independent of the productivity of the agent. In my model,
the post-deviation payoﬀs are increasing in the productivity or wealth of a player. This is why an agent may not
have an incentive to follow cooperation under equal sharing when the same agent has an incentive to cooperate under
proportional sharing.
15Another observation is that, with this model, we do not observe a U-shaped relationship between
heterogeneity and cooperation as in Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002). This is precisely because
of the overlapping-generations structure of the game, or of heterogeneity among resource users in
their life span. Under ‘complete’ inequality where productivity is zero for all agents except for one
in each generation, externality across generations still remains. Sole ownership in each generation
does not imply eﬃciency in an overlapping-generations model.
If s0  = s∗ and

i ai > rK
4 , then no Pareto optimal allocation is stationary. The above
condition is suﬃcient for ﬁrst-best sustainability as long as the initial stock s0 exceeds s∗.I f
s0 <s ∗, then ﬁrst-best sustainability requires additional assumptions.
4 Commons with Outside Options
Empirical studies have mixed ﬁndings about the eﬀects of ‘market integration’ or outside economic
opportunities on local CPR management. As seen in section 1, theoretical studies also ﬁnd ambigu-
ity regarding those eﬀects. One reason behind these mixed ﬁndings is that market integration takes
several diﬀerent forms where each has a diﬀerent eﬀect on resource users’ decisions to cooperate in
the commons. There are three sorts of outside opportunities that are relevant to people with rural
commons: a labor-market opportunity, a resource-product market opportunity and a (micro)credit
opportunity. The ﬁrst opportunity allows agents to provide labor and earn wage income outside the
commons. With the second opportunity, agents can trade the resource harvested to outsiders for
other commodities at some given price. Microcredit allows agents to make investment for increas-
ing their harvesting productivity and to produce goods other than harvest. By classifying outside
opportunities into the above three distinct categories, this section examines the eﬀects of each type
of market integration on cooperation in the commons. In what follows, assume the following:
Assumption 5 All agents have the same harvesting productivity a>0 such that Na ≥ rK
4 ,s o
that agents can harvest the unconstrained maximum sustainable yield. The initial stock level s0 is
equal to the MSY level s∗.
16Assumption 5 allows us to focus on the eﬀect of outside options on cooperation in the commons
without complications arising from non-stationarity of equilibrium.
4.1 Access to a labor market
Suppose ﬁrst that agents have an option to participate in an outside labor market.
Assumption 6 Agents have access to a labor market by paying ﬁxed cost fl ≥ 0. Upon access,
an agents who provides l units of labor receives wage wl where w ≥ 0 is a given wage rate in each
period.
Agents are price takers. An increase in w may be a result of economic growth in urban areas outside
the commons. Parameter fl represents the transaction of market access or barriers to trade. Let
lh ∈ [0,1] and lo ∈ [0,1] represent the units of labor an agent supplies for harvesting and to the
outside labor market. If an agent chooses lh < 1 and l0 ∈ (0,1 − lh], then the agent’s income
when young is given by lha + low − fl. If an agent does not supply labor to the market, then
the income is lha. The agents may or may not use labor-market options under stationary Pareto
optimal allocations. Figure 2 describes three types of optimal labor allocations under diﬀerent
combinations of fl and w. Agents do not harvest the resource but work outside in the stationary
Pareto optimal allocation if the wage rate is suﬃciently high relative to the ﬁxed market-entry cost.
How do changes in the wage rate and the market-entry cost inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability?
The following proposition asserts that the eﬀect is nonnegative.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1-6, the following holds:
(i) If the ﬁrst best is supportable in equilibrium without a labor market opportunity, then the ﬁrst
best is supportable under any combination of wage rate w and market-entry cost fl.
(ii) If the ﬁrst best is not supportable in equilibrium without a labor market opportunity, then the
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o: allocation of labor for harvesting and outside labor market.)
(w: wage rate of the outside market, fl: cost of entry to the labor market.)
Figure 2: Stationary Pareto optimal allocations under diﬀerent conditions of the labor market.
Proposition 3 implies that access to outside labor markets alone does not have a negative eﬀect on
ﬁrst-best sustainability and can be welfare-improving for the agents. Access to an outside labor
market does not discourage cooperative resource use because high wage rates induce resource users
to provide more labor in the labor market (and hence to use less labor for harvesting).
4.2 Access to product markets
This section considers ﬁrst-best sustainability when agents have access to product markets where
they can trade goods. Assume the following:
Assumption 7 Agents receive utility from consuming harvest and another good (manufacturing




m when the consumption of
harvest and the manufacturing good is (ch,c m).14
14The assumption on the functional form of utility makes the computation of payoﬀs straightforward.
18Assumption 8 Agents have access to product markets by paying ﬁxed cost fm > 0. Upon access,
agents can purchase the manufacturing good at price pm, in terms of harvest, in each period.
With access to the product markets, agents can trade their harvest for the manufacturing good
at a ﬁxed price pm. Like fl, the ﬁxed cost fm measures the transaction cost of market access.
With assumptions 7 and 8, each young agent chooses eﬀort, ’participate’ or ‘not participate’ in
the product markets, consumption of harvest and the manufacturing good, and transfer of harvest
and the manufacturing good to old agents.15 Under these additional assumptions, the maximum
sustainable yield is still consistent with Pareto optimality. Without access to the product markets,
consumption of the manufacturing good is zero. With access to product markets, agents can trade
harvest for the manufacturing good but pays a ﬁxed cost fm. So a stationary Pareto optimal


























ch,y,c m,y,c h,o,c m,o ≥ 0,0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(Superscript tr stands for ‘trade’ in the product markets, and subscripts y and o for consumption
when young and when old.) The following proposition gives the condition for ﬁrst-best sustainability
in the presence of product markets.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1-5, 7 and 8, a stationary autarky Pareto optimal allocation is











Pareto optimal allocation, where product markets options are used, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium





≥ a + β2fm.
The condition for ﬁrst-best sustainability is stronger in the presence of product-market options.
How does a product-market option inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability? The following corollary
follows from proposition 4.
15Assume that the agents cannot produce the manufacturing good. This assumption is relaxed in the next subsec-
tion.
19(a) (b)
I: Autarky is first best and supportable I: Autarky is first best and supportable
Autarky is first best, not supportable Autarky is first best, not supportable
Trade is first best, not supportable Trade is first best, not supportable
Trade is first best and supportable
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Figure 3: First best sustainability with product markets.
Corollary 3 Suppose that assumptions 1-5, 7 and 8 hold and that the ﬁrst best is supportable in
equilibrium without product markets option (i.e. (1 + β2)rK
4N ≥ a).
(i) There exists two nonempty sets of combinations of product-market prices and market entry
costs A,B ⊆ IR 2
+ such that (i) for any (pm,f m) ∈ A, an autarky Pareto optimal allocation
cannot be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and (ii) for any (pm,f m) ∈ B,
a Pareto optimal allocation that involves the use of the product-market option cannot be
supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
(ii) If the market entry cost fm is zero, then, for any manufacturing price pm ≥ 0, the ﬁrst best
is supportable and the agents’ maximum equilibrium payoﬀs increase upon trade.
As opposed to labor-market options, product-market options may deteriorate cooperative resource
use in the commons. The second point of corollary 3 is that access to product markets (given any
manufacturing price level) does not inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability as long as the market-entry
cost fm is zero. Figure 3 describes how the condition for ﬁrst-best sustainability changes under
various values of market options (pm,f m) when the ﬁrst best is sustainable without market options
(i.e. (1 + β2)rK
4N ≥ a). In both cases (a) and (b) in the ﬁgure, region II (III) represents the set
20A (B) in corollary 3—the set of market options where the ﬁrst best becomes unsupportable. For
suﬃciently high market entry cost levels (in region I), Pareto optimal allocations are supportable
in equilibrium. Given a price of the manufacturing good, a decline in the market entry cost (from
region I to region II or III) will cause the ﬁrst best to become unsupportable.
4.3 Access to microcredit for production
Suppose that agents have access to microcredit, which they can use to increase their harvesting
capacity or to purchase inputs for manufacturing.
Assumption 9 The agents have access to a credit market where agents can purchase inputs for
harvest-capacity expansion and manufacturing. The input price is rk > 0. With kh units of input,
the harvest productivity increases by bhk
1/2
h . With km units of input, an agent can produce bmk
1/2
m
units of the manufacturing good.
With inputs for harvest-capacity expansion, agents can increase their eﬀort levels per unit of labor.
With inputs for manufacturing, agents can produce manufacturing good on their own.16 With
assumptions 7-9, each young agent chooses eﬀort, consumption of harvest and the manufacturing
good, inputs for harvest-capacity expansion and manufacturing, and transfer of harvest and the
manufacturing good to old agents.
In what follows, in order to isolate the eﬀects of credit on ﬁrst-best sustainability, assume
that the product-markets entry cost fm is zero. If the total harvest productivity Na exceeds the
maximum sustainable yield rK
4 as in assumption 5, then the input for harvest-capacity expansion
kh is zero for all agents in a stationary Pareto optimal allocation. By deviating from a cooper-
ative strategy supporting the stationary Pareto optimal allocation with MSY, an agent can now
harvest more than a by increasing the harvesting productivity through microcredit. The following
proposition describes the condition for ﬁrst-best sustainability under access to microcredit.
16I assume away labor inputs for harvest-capacity expansion and manufacturing, and hence the problem of labor
allocation between harvesting and manufacturing. With labor allocation between harvesting and other activities,
sustaining the MSY may not be Pareto optimal. See section 5 for a further discussion.
21Proposition 5 Under assumptions 1-5 and 7-9, a stationary Pareto optimal allocation is supported

















Furthermore, a stationary Pareto optimal allocation is supportable (not supportable) as an equilib-
rium outcome if
βpmbm
bh is suﬃciently large (small).
In inequality (3), the left-hand side represents the payoﬀ from cooperation and the right-hand side
the maximum payoﬀ upon deviation. The term
(pmbm)2
4rk is the maximum income from manufactur-
ing, and a +
b2
h
4rk the maximum harvest upon the optimal deviation from cooperation. Proposition
5 implies that whether the ﬁrst best is supportable in the presence of microcredit depends on the
proﬁtability of manufacturing relative to harvest-capacity expansion. Recall that, without access





When condition (4) does not hold, condition (3) holds if βpmbm − bh is suﬃciently large. That
is, access to credit improves agents’ incentive to cooperate in resource use if the agents’ discount
factor is large and if the marginal return from manufacturing (measured by pmbm) is larger than the
marginal return from harvest capacity expansion (measured by bh). Alternatively, even if condition
(4) holds, condition (3) may not hold if bh is suﬃciently larger than pmbm. Hence, access to credit
for income-generating opportunities may discourage agents to cooperate in resource use.
5 Discussion
This paper introduced a dynamic game of common-property resource use with overlapping gen-
erations of players to investigate conditions under which a subgame perfect equilibrium supports
cooperative resource use across generations of resource users. The main ﬁndings include (1) the
conditions for ﬁrst-best sustainability that are consistent with stylized facts of commons, (2) the
22eﬀects of heterogeneity on collective action, and (3) the eﬀects of access to outside markets on
collective action.
The results of the model explain stylized facts about successful commons: a ﬁrst-best, co-
operative resource use is supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when the resource
users’ discount rate is low, the number of resource users is small, and the resource capacity is large
(i.e. large carrying capacity and high intrinsic growth rate of the resource) relative to the resource
users’ harvesting capacity. Heterogeneity among resource users in harvesting productivity does
not inﬂuence ﬁrst-best sustainability when a resource user’s harvest share is proportional to the
user’s eﬀort exerted for harvesting. If the resource users’ harvest shares are equal regardless of each
one’s eﬀort exerted, then the ﬁrst best becomes unsupportable in equilibrium when inequality in
productivity of resource users increases. Diﬀerent outside market options have diﬀerent eﬀects on
the eﬃcient use of a local commons. Access to an outside labor market does not inﬂuence ﬁrst-best
sustainability and may increase the resource users’ equilibrium welfare. However, cooperation may
become unsupportable when agents have access to a market for selling harvest or a credit market
when they could sustain cooperation without such access. In particular, the ﬁrst best becomes
unsustainable as the cost of access to these markets declines. This result suggests that local non-
market institutions may deteriorate as resource users in local commons gain access to external
markets at a lower cost.
These ﬁndings explain tension between younger and older generations that are often found
in rural villages in developing countries, where increasing outside opportunities in the course of
national economic development resulted in malfunctioning of local CPR governance (Baland and
Platteau 1996, pp.275-277). Findings regarding product markets are consistent with case studies
where resource degradation occurred after opportunities to sell highly-valued cash crops became
available to people in local commons.
The analytical results in this paper have the following policy implications. First, the analysis
suggests that self-governance will not work if conditions for ﬁrst-best sustainability are not satisﬁed.
23In such cases, policy interventions by an outside authority may be necessary to enhance or enforce
cooperation.17 Even in cases where it may be possible to support ﬁrst-best sustainability, a wrong
set of policies or institutions may prevent this from occurring. Ineﬃciency may be a result of
inappropriate rules of resource use that are not consistent with heterogeneity of resource users. In
many countries, policies for conservation of CPRs included land reform or nationalization of forests,
and many of them did not work to stop resource overuse.18 The analysis suggests that one reason
such policies do work is because they may not respect heterogeneity of the regulated resource users.
The result from section 4.2 implies that, in equilibrium, agents will not trade in product
markets when the entry cost to the markets is prohibitively high. When the entry cost is zero, then
market participation increases the resource users’ maximum equilibrium payoﬀs without resource
overuse. Access to product markets with some positive cost of market barriers, however, may cause
the ﬁrst best to become unsupportable. In the course of market integration of local commons,
policies can mitigate resource overuse by reducing the barriers to trade.
Section 4.3 examined the eﬀect of microcredit on ﬁrst-best sustainability without labor
market options. Without labor markets, restrictions on microcredit—so that credit cannot be used
for harvest-capacity expansion—may be necessary in order to avoid resource overuse. However,
if agents have access to a labor market (with a suﬃciently high market wage rate) along with
microcredit for production, then microcredit for harvest-capacity expansion can be eﬀective in both
reducing poverty and sustaining eﬃcient resource use. This is because, with improved harvesting
productivity, agents can maintain the same harvest with less labor inputs where the saved labor
can receive wages in the labor market. Therefore, introduction of microcredit will be eﬀective in
reducing poverty and sustainable resource use in an environment where essential inputs for resource
use, including labor, can be utilized elsewhere.
This research abstracts from several aspects of CPR use, including the cost of monitoring
17Such external intervention may have its own set of problems. See Ostrom (1990).
18Examples include an irrigation project in Sri Lanka and nationalization of forests in Nepal (Ostrom 1990, p.157
and p.178).
24agents’ actions, heterogeneity among agents in non-economic dimensions, non-market values of
natural resources and uncertainty in resource transition. The model in this paper assumes that
agents from diﬀerent generations interact only once. As in the folk theorem for repeated games
with overlapping generations of players (Kandori 1992), ﬁrst-best sustainability is increasing in the
frequency of interactions by agents from diﬀerent generations. Therefore, the condition for ﬁrst-
best sustainability derived in this study can be interpreted as the condition for the least auspicious
environment for intergenerational cooperation in the commons. Some authors suggest that group-
based lending of microcredit (e.g. by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) helped improved non-
market collective action in local villages (Anderson, et al. 2002, 2003). A close examination of the
relation among the types of lending, market environments and resource use will suggest the design
of microcredit schemes that works against rural poverty and promotes collective action. The eﬀect
of outside options to a commons was examined in a partial equilibrium model. Migration from local
commons to the urban area and scarcity of resources will aﬀect the resource price and the wage
rate. The number of resource users is assumed to be ﬁxed in the model, but a high resource-product
price (e.g., the price of cash crops) will induce outsiders to enter the commons, and this may result
in the breakdown of ﬁrst-best sustainability. Exploration of these issues is left for future research.
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